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Methodology

The Explosive Weapons Monitor reports on civilian harm from the use of explosive weapons, including civilian casualties and attacks on civilian infrastructure. This reporting is based on data collected by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) and Insecurity Insight, including incidents of explosive weapons use that reportedly caused civilian casualties, including deaths and injuries, as well as incidents that affected civilian access to healthcare, education, humanitarian aid, food and water systems. 

The data presented by the Explosive Weapons Monitor do not capture every casualty or incident of explosive weapons use that occurred in any given reporting period. They also do not capture the many additional ways in which civilians are impacted by the use of explosive weapons, such as displacement, psychosocial trauma and impeded economic development. The impact of explosive weapons use is much greater. Instead, the Explosive Weapons Monitor aims to identify patterns of harm from the use of explosive weapons around the globe and to demonstrate a clear need to mitigate risk to civilians, take steps to prevent the harm to civilians caused by the use of explosive weapons, and to provide necessary, lifesaving and longer-term assistance to victims and survivors.

This methodology is continuously updated. The last update was on 1 June 2026.

1. Dashboard fields

1.1. Affected countries, territories and maritime locations

Countries, territories and maritime locations where incidents of explosive weapons that reportedly caused harm to civilians or damage and destruction of civilian infrastructure were recorded by data sources. 

1.2. Civilian harm incidents

All incidents of explosive weapons use that reportedly caused harm to civilians or damage and destruction of civilian infrastructure were recorded by data sources. 

1.3. Civilian fatalities

Civilian deaths recorded by ACLED, and in the instance of deaths of essential service workers or beneficiaries (such as health workers, teachers, students, etc.), also by Insecurity Insight. 

1.4. Attacks on civilian infrastructure

All incidents of explosive weapons use that reportedly damaged and destroyed civilian infrastructure, recorded by Insecurity Insight. 

1.5. Civilian casualty incidents

All incidents of explosive weapons use that reportedly caused civilian deaths or injuries, recorded by ACLED. 

1.6. Estimated ranges of civilian injuries

The Explosive Weapons Monitor uses a standardized methodology to estimate the number of civilians injured from fatality data available from ACLED. This methodology supports a transparent and standardized approach to reporting civilian casualties from explosive weapons, especially where injury data is incomplete or unavailable (see full methodology below). 

1.7. Health workers killed

Deaths reportedly attributed to explosive weapons of any person working in a professional or voluntary capacity in the provision of health services or who provides direct support to patients, including administrators, ambulance personnel, community health workers, dentists, doctors, government health officials, hospital staff, medical education staff, nurses, midwives, paramedics, physiotherapists, surgeons, vaccination workers, volunteers, or any other health personnel not named here.

1.8. Educators and students killed

Deaths reportedly attributed to explosive weapons of anyone working professionally or participating as a pupil in an education system, or volunteering at any level of the education system, including teachers, academics, education support and transport staff (for example, education administrators, janitors, bus drivers, librarians), education officials, and students. 

1.9. Aid workers killed

Deaths reportedly attributed to explosive weapons of individuals employed by or attached to a humanitarian, UN, international, national or government aid agency.

1.10. Attacks on health infrastructure

Incidents in which explosive weapons damaged or destroyed any facility that provides direct support to patients, including clinics, hospitals, laboratories, makeshift hospitals, medical education facilities, mobile clinics, pharmacies, warehouses, or any other health facility not named here. It also includes any vehicle used to transport any injured or ill person, or woman in labour, to a health facility to receive medical care.

1.11. Attacks on education infrastructure

Incidents in which explosive weapons damaged or destroyed any facility providing education or resources which is used to support the educational process, including kindergartens, schools, universities, technical and vocational education training institutes, textbook and school warehouse facilities as well as dedicated school buses transporting children to and from schools.

1.12. Attacks on aid infrastructure

Incidents in which explosive weapons damaged or destroyed any property belonging to an aid organisation which is used to support the delivery of aid including vehicles, compounds, offices, IDP/refugee camps, and materials/supplies.

1.13. Attacks on food infrastructure

Incidents in which explosive weapons damaged or destroyed of critical food infrastructure, including agricultural lands, irrigation systems, livestock facilities, markets, bakeries, food warehouses, aid convoys, and humanitarian distribution points used to alleviate food insecurity in conflict-affected communities.

1.14. Attacks on water infrastructure

Incidents in which explosive weapons damaged or destroyed critical water infrastructure, including water tanks, pipelines, water towers, pumping stations, and other infrastructure essential to the distribution and supply of water to civilian communities.

2. Other Definitions

2.1. Populated areas

The Explosive Weapons Monitor defines populated areas as “any concentration of civilians, be it permanent or temporary, such as in inhabited parts of cities, or inhabited towns or villages, or as in camps or columns of refugees or evacuees, or groups of nomads,” synonymous with the term “concentration of civilians” which appears in existing international humanitarian law (IHL). The references to refugees, evacuees and nomads and the use of the term “inhabited” suggests that the presence of civilians and civilian objects – which need not be in great numbers – is a defining characteristic of populated areas.[1] While the data presented here do not distinguish between the use of explosive weapons in populated and unpopulated areas, the indicators of harm – civilian casualties and civilian infrastructure and services – suggests that the majority of incidents recorded by each data source above likely occurred in populated areas.

2.2. Explosive Weapons Categories

ACLED and Insecurity Insight record the use of explosive weapons across a range of weapons categories that correspond with those defined and used by the Explosive Weapons Monitor. These definitions include:

2.2.1. Ground-launched explosive weapons

Ground-launched explosive weapons are launched from any surface-level platform, including weapons thrown by a person, or fired from warships or vehicles. These include artillery shells (projectiles fired from a gun, cannon, howitzer, or recoilless rifle), tank shells, ground-launched missiles, mortars, rockets (typically missiles which do not contain guidance systems), non-specific shelling, rocket-propelled grenades, and hand grenades.

 2.2.2. Air-launched explosive weapons

Air-launched explosive weapons include any weapon fired from a rotary of fixed-wing aircraft, including unmanned aerial vehicles or drones. These include air-dropped bombs (bombs reported as being delivered by air), airstrikes (attacks from a helicopter, drone, or plane), and missiles or rockets launched from an aircraft.     

2.2.3. Directly-emplaced explosive weapons

Directly-emplaced explosive weapons encompass weapons that are physically placed in the location at which they detonate. These include anti-personnel mines, anti-vehicle mines, landmines, non-specific IEDs (including so-called ‘suicide vests’), car bombs and roadside bombs.

2.3. Affected countries, territories and maritime locations

Countries, territories and maritime locations where incidents of explosive weapons that reportedly caused harm to civilians or damage and destruction of civilian infrastructure were recorded by data sources are considered to be ‘affected’ by, or experienced civilian harm from, explosive weapons use. In the case that incidents occurred in international and/or territorial waters, the Explosive Weapons Monitor defaults to ACLED and Insecurity Insight for coding and reporting such incidents. In these cases, both organisations default to the country or territory closest to the recorded geocoordinates of each incident. In many cases, the Explosive Weapons Monitor will also note the maritime location associated with each incident.  

3. Using ACLED data to identify civilian casualties and relevant incidents

The Explosive Weapons Monitor downloads data from ACLED in order to identify incidents in which explosive weapons reportedly caused civilian casualties, including civilian deaths and injuries. It also used ACLED data to identify numbers of these incidents, numbers of civilian fatalities, and estimated ranges of civilian injuries.

3.1. Methodology

ACLED collects reported information on the type, agents, location, date, and other characteristics of political violence events, demonstration events, and other select non-violent, politically-relevant developments in every country and territory in the world. ACLED focuses on tracking a range of violent and non-violent actions by or affecting political agents, including governments, rebels, militias, identity groups, political parties, external forces, rioters, protesters, and civilians. For more information about ACLED’s methodologies, please see https://acleddata.com/knowledge-base/codebook/.

3.1.1. Identifying incidents by weapons categories

The Explosive Weapons Monitor accesses all ACLED data relevant to Explosions/Remote violence events to identify incidents in which explosive weapons reportedly caused civilian deaths and injuries. This includes only subevents in which the incidents were coded to the following: air/drone strike, suicide bomb, shelling/artillery/missile attack, remote explosive/landmine/IED, and grenades. To ensure relevant subevent categorisation and compatibility with Explosive Weapons Monitor definitions, each recorded event is classified into the categories of air-launched, ground-launched, or directly-emplaced explosive weapons. 

Weapon Launch Type
Explosive Weapons Monitor ACLED 1: Event ACLED 2: Subevent
Air-launched Explosions/Remote violence Air/drone strike
Ground-launched Explosions/Remote violence

Shelling/artillery/missile attack

Grenade

Directly-emplaced Explosions/Remote violence Explosions/Remote violenceRemote explosive/landmine/IED
Mixed launch methods
3.1.2. Identifying civilian casualty incidents

The Explosive Weapons Monitor identifies incidents in which fatalities and injuries involving civilians were recorded primarily through filters and analysis of the field ‘actor2,’ filtering of events in which civilians were the main or only target of an event in the field ‘civilian_targeting’, and analysis of ‘notes’. Incidents indicating the use of explosive weapons by states are primarily determined through filters and analysis of the field ‘actor1,’ and analysis of ‘notes’.

3.1.3. Identifying user status

Incidents attributed to state and non-state actors are identified by filtering and analyzing entries in the "actor1" field, with additional verification provided by manually reviewing the “notes” field to confirm weapon use and target. Incidents involving unexploded ordnance identified (UXO) are removed when analysing the use of explosive weapons by state and non-state actors.

3.2. Estimating civilian injuries 

The Explosive Weapons Monitor uses a standardized methodology to estimate the number of civilians injured from fatality data available from ACLED. This methodology supports a transparent and standardized approach to reporting civilian casualties from explosive weapons, especially where injury data is incomplete or unavailable. 

While there is some under-reporting of fatalities, in most contexts there is a general approximation.  In the case of injuries, however, injury in many conflict settings is not reported or information is incomplete or inconsistent due to constraints on access, ongoing hostilities, reporting delays, and source discrepancies. As a result, such reporting fluctuates. Civilians injured by explosive weapons are often underreported or not reported at all, even where fatalities are recorded.

By using ACLED fatality counts as the basis for estimation, the Explosive Weapons Monitor is able to provide a more consistent indication of likely civilian injuries as an aspect of harm, while acknowledging the uncertainty inherent in conflict casualty data. 

This approach allows Explosive Weapons Monitor to present a minimum and maximum estimated injury range. The upper estimate may be closer to reported injury figures where sources reliably record and report both injuries and fatalities. However, injury-to-fatality ratios can also fluctuate significantly over limited periods of time, including within the same country and conflict context. Estimated figures should be understood as indicative of the scale of harm to civilians in this aspect, and not as definitive figures.

To support consistent and comparable reporting, the Explosive Weapons Monitor applies a formula-based approach to estimate injuries from reported fatalities. The methodology is based on injury ratios derived from previous years of the Explosive Weapons Monitor’s reporting on civilian casualties as recorded by ACLED. This methodology applies lower- and upper-bound estimates for injuries based on the range observed in previous data as reported monthly, in which injuries accounted for between 41 percent and 79 percent of total civilian casualties. 

The range is calculated as follows:

  • Minimum estimated injuries are calculated by multiplying recorded fatalities by 41/59 (0.695), reflecting a historical distribution where 59 percent of casualties are killed and 41 percent injured. For example, for 100 fatalities: 69 minimum estimated injuries.
  • Maximum estimated injuries are calculated by multiplying recorded fatalities by 79/2 (3.762), reflecting a historical distribution where 21 percent of casualties are killed and 79 percent injured. For example, for 100 fatalities: 376 maximum estimated injuries

3.3. Challenges in identifying numbers of civilian casualties

Identifying the numbers of civilian casualties of explosive weapons presents numerous challenges, including data availability, verification and accuracy. In conflict situations, there is often limited media access and a lack of infrastructure and resources for data collection, hindering the ability to gather comprehensive information. Underreporting of casualties can be due to a combination of factors, such as changing media focus on conflicts and inaccessible areas. Data or reporting can be biased according to specific aims, narratives or outlooks. Distinguishing civilian deaths from available information can also be challenging, especially when reporting sources use unclear terminology and terms to identify civilians, such as ‘people’ rather than specifying ‘civilians’. As such, numbers of casualties presented by the Explosive Weapons Monitor are almost certainly an underrepresentation of civilian death and injury. Additionally, civilian casualties caused by explosive weapons may have occurred in countries and territories not identified in this report.

4. Using Insecurity Insight data to identify attacks on education, healthcare, humanitarian aid, food security and water systems

Insecurity Insight provides data to the Explosive Weapons Monitor on incidents of explosive weapons use that reportedly caused civilian casualties, including deaths and injuries, as well as incidents that affected civilian access to healthcare, education, humanitarian aid and food security. This data is used to report on deaths of health, education and aid workers, as well as attacks on health, education and aid infrastructure.

Data provided to the Explosive Weapons Monitor on food insecurity is not global. However, with this caveat, the numbers of attacks on food-related infrastructure will be included in the aggregate totals of attacks on civilian infrastructure. Otherwise, this data will appear in country-specific call-out boxes in the interactive map where relevant.

4.1. Methodology

Insecurity Insight has been documenting a wide range of violence affecting the aid sector since 2008. Datasets on violence against healthcare and education go back to 2016 and 2017, respectively. For the Explosive Weapons Monitor, Insecurity Insight contributes information on global incidents of explosive weapons use affecting aid access, education or healthcare services. Information is compiled from Arabic, Burmese, English, French and Spanish media reports. The following elements are recorded: the date and location of the reported incident, weapon type, reported user and target, detonation method and whether the incident affected aid, education or health by specifying whether health facilities, schools or project sites were damaged or destroyed and/or whether medical, teaching or aid staff were injured or killed. For more information about Insecurity Insight’s methodologies, please see https://insecurityinsight.org/.

Data also includes some incidents where the explosive weapon device did not detonate and when there were no civilian casualties, but when the presence of explosive weapons affected access to health, education or food aid, usually because areas are cordoned off and access to services are interrupted. This includes incidents where historical items such as unexploded ordnance were found, and which affected the provision of these services.

Reported incidents are neither complete nor a representative list of all incidents and are subject to the limitations inherent in the data sources. In some countries, the media frequently reports a wide range of incidents, while in others, hardly any incidents are reported by media outlets. In some countries, there are active networks of organisations who report information, while in others, no such networks exist. In some areas, important and trusted interest groups have an active social media presence, while in other contexts social media is deliberately used to promote false information. The content of other data collection processes that are made available via databases is also influenced by the nature of public discourse and the networks the data collector maintains. In some cases, incidents can overlap and impact more than one sector (for example, both ‘aid access’ and ‘education’). This occurs when the health or education service is delivered by a humanitarian or development aid agency. Most incidents have not been independently verified and have not undergone verification by Insecurity Insight.

5. Use of Explosive Weapons by State and Non-State Actors

Identification of responsible state armed forces and non-state armed actors and all additional information is as recorded by ACLED and Insecurity Insight, with the following exceptions:

  • Country and territory names may be adapted by the Explosive Weapons Monitor according to names designated by the UN Statistics Division or as they appear on the list of endorsing states of the Political Declaration on the ewipa.org website.
  • When attributing explosive weapons use to specific actors, the Explosive Weapons Monitor excludes events recorded by ACLED that involve unexploded ordnance (UXO) attributed to both state armed forces and non-state armed actors.
  • When use of explosive weapons is attributed to coalition forces by ACLED, the Explosive Weapons Monitor does not use these incidents to identify reported use of explosive weapons by individual state armed forces.
  • ACLED records the use of explosive weapons by Houthi forces in Yemen as those of the armed forces of Yemen. The Explosive Weapons Monitor has instead designated the use of explosive weapons by Houthi forces to be that of non-state armed actors.

The Explosive Weapons Monitor cannot determine with total certainty which actors are responsible for use of explosive weapons in specific incidents, as much of the recorded data are unverified. Each organisation has similar but varied methodologies for attribution of incidents to state and non-state actors.[2] In all cases, non-state armed actors, referenced below, include all non-state actors that reportedly perpetrated explosive violence and is not limited to non-state armed groups.

5.1. Identifying ranges of incidents

In some analysis, such as Annual Reports, the Explosive Weapons Monitor will use ranges of numbers of incidents that are meant to be indicative of contexts and patterns of use as the complexity of the information environment does not allow for the determination of a precise number of incidents that can be attributed to use by each actor. To identify these contexts and patterns, the Explosive Weapons Monitor developed ranges of numbers of incidents, as below:

Ranges of numbers of incidents in which explosive weapons use reportedly caused harm to civilian casualties
1 - 9
10 - 99
100 - 199
200 - 499
500 - 999
1,000+

To determine which range is relevant for each actor and/or country in which explosive weapons use was reported, the Explosive Weapons Monitor first determines numbers of incidents in which civilian deaths or injuries were recorded by ACLED. The Explosive Weapons Monitor then determined numbers of incidents in which civilian access to healthcare, education and humanitarian aid were recorded by Insecurity Insight. To ensure incidents recorded by Insecurity Insight were not duplicates of incidents recorded by ACLED, the Explosive Weapons Monitor disregarded incidents in which health, medical or aid workers were killed or injured and determined only the numbers of incidents in which health, education and aid infrastructure were damaged or destroyed. These numbers were then added to relevant numbers of incidents in which casualties occurred in order to develop the figure used to determine the correct ranges, as above.

 
  1. See Article 1(2), Protocol on Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (1980). See also ICRC (2016). ‘Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas – Factsheet’; Human Rights Watch and Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic (2022). ‘Safeguarding Civilians: A Humanitarian Interpretation of the Political Declaration on the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas’, pp.8-9.