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Saudi Arabia

HAS NOT ENDORSED THE POLITICAL DECLARATION

Saudi Arabia has not yet endorsed the Political Declaration on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. It did, however, participate in the negotiations towards a Political Declaration, where it supported a suggestion to include mention of states that fight “terrorism” in section 2 of the draft.1 Saudi Arabia aligned with the Arab Group’s statement to the 2021 round of consultations in which the Group noted that the aim of the Declaration should be to strengthen protection of civilians through enhancing existing IHL, not by establishing new rules, concepts, or mechanisms and emphasised that existing IHL rules and principles must be applied fully and effectively to protect civilians. The Group also expressed concern that the Declaration overlooked use of human shields, and may stigmatise explosive weapons use in general.2

Statements and positions

At the United Nations General Assembly First Committee in 2024, Saudi Arabia’s statement highlighted Israel’s use of and harm from the explosive weapons in populated areas in Gaza.3  

At the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 2024, a working paper submitted by the Arab Group, of which Saudi Arabia is a member, drew attention to the Political Declaration, and the importance of strengthening civilian protection from the humanitarian consequences of explosive weapons in populated areas.4

As a member of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, Saudi Arabia aligned with the World Humanitarian Summit Core Commitments to ‘Uphold the Norms that Safeguard Humanity’ in May 2016, including the commitment “to promote and enhance the protection of civilians and civilian objects, especially in the conduct of hostilities, for instance by working to prevent civilian harm resulting from the use of wide-area explosive weapons in populated areas, and by sparing civilian infrastructure from military use in the conduct of military operations.”5

  1. Acheson, R. 2020. ‘Impacts, not intentionality: the imperative of focusing on the effects of explosive weapons in a Political Declaration’. Reaching Critical Will. 14 February 2020. https://reachingcriticalwill.org/news/latest-news/14658-impacts-not-intentionality-the-imperative-of-focusing-on-the-effects-of-explosive-weapons-in-a-political-declaration 

  1. Rafferty, J., Geyer, K., Acheson, R., 2021. ‘Report on the March 2021 consultations on a Political Declaration on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas’. Reaching Critical Will. 21 March 2021. https://reachingcriticalwill.org/news/latest-news/15213-report-on-the-march-2021-consultations-on-a-political-declaration-on-the-use-of-explosive-weapons-in-populated-areas; ‘Arab Group Statement–EWIPA Political Declaration Informal Consultations’. Arab Group. March 2021. https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/ewipa/declaration/statements/3March_Arab-Group.pdf 

  1. United Nations Security Council, S/PV.9632 (Resumption 2), 22 May 2024, https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/pro/n24/142/87/pdf/n2414287.pdf  

  1. Arab Group, ‘Working Paper: Implementation of Obligations Under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in Light of Violations by the Occupying Power in the Palestinian Territory and Lebanon’, 19 November 2024, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/ccw/2024/hcp/statements/14Nov_Arab_Group.pdf  

  1. Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Agenda for Humanity. https://agendaforhumanity.org/stakeholder/233.html. 

Other State Positions